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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EIMANN V. SOLDIER OF FORTUNE AND
"NEGLIGENT ADVERTISING" ACTIONS: COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN AN ERA OF
REDUCED FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
In Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune,1 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas ruled that the first amendment did not
preclude a negligence action against Soldier of Fortune for injuries
allegedly resulting from an advertisement published by the magazine.2
The Eimann decision comes in an era of reduced first amendment
protection of commercial speech3 and seems to open the courthouse
doors to a flood of "negligent advertising" actions.4 This Comment
delineates the impact Eimann should have on an advertisement
publisher's tort liability and duty to the public.
Part I of this Comment discusses the facts and ruling in Eimann. Part
II briefly traces the history of first amendment protection of commercial
speech, from its first recognition in 1976 to its present reduced state.
Part III contrasts the rationale behind the recklessness standard of care
historically imposed on publishers with the negligence standard that the
Eimann court espoused. It suggests that the lesser degree of
constitutional protection afforded commercial speech today may have
provided the basis for the court's ruling. Part IV argues that courts
should read Eimann narrowly in order to reasonably balance the
publisher's interest in freedom of speech with the public's interest in
protection from advertisements that cause injury, and in order to avoid
the unwarranted expansion of an advertisement publisher's tort liability.
Additionally, to provide courts with a means to effectuate such a balance,
Part IV proposes a standard for courts to apply in future negligent
advertising actions. Finally, Part V concludes that the courts should
allow a negligent advertising action against a publisher only when the
publisher knew or should have known that the advertisement foreseeably
invited criminal activity which caused the plaintiff's injury.
1 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
2 Id.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech." Nevertheless, "[t]he Constitution ... accords lesser protection to commercial speech than
to other constitutionally guaranteed expression." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
The Supreme Court has defined "commercial speech" as "speech which does no more than
propose a commercial transaction." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386 (1973)). Alternatively, the Court has described it as "expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
561.
4 See infra note 87 and accompanying text. Commentators have dubbed the type of cause of
action seen in Eimann as a "negligent advertising" action because the plaintiff is allowed to proceed
against the advertisement publisher on a negligence theory.
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I. Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune
Eimann involved a contract for murder between John Wayne Hearn
and Robert Black, Jr. Hearn submitted the following advertisement to
Soldier of Fortune magazine:
EX-MARINES-67-69 'Nam vets-ex-DI-weapons specialist-jungle
warfare, pilot, M.E., high risk assignments U.S. or overseas. (404)991-
2684.
5
After the magazine published the advertisement, Robert Black, Jr., con-
tacted Hearn and arranged for the murder of Sandra Black, his wife.6
When Hearn subsequently murdered Sandra Black, her mother and son
sued Soldier of Fortune in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas for negligent publication of the advertisement. 7 The
plaintiffs based their action on the theory that the publisher had a duty to
investigate the nature of the advertisement.8
The defendant's motion for dismissal or summary judgment argued
that the first amendment precluded liability for the advertisement, that
the magazine owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs, and that the plain-
tiffs' injuries resulted from the unforeseeable intervening criminal con-
duct of third persons.9 In denying the motion, the court concluded that
first amendment protection afforded commercial speech did not preclude
a negligence action against the publisher.10 Furthermore, because the
plaintiffs presented evidence that the publisher had notice that its per-
sonal service advertisements had been used for criminal purposes, the
court held that "an issue of material fact has been raised as to whether
Defendants knew or should have known of the nature of the advertise-
ment and, thus, should have foreseen the likelihood that criminal con-
duct would ensue."' 1
II. Eimann's Constitutional Context: The Eroding First Amendment
Protection of Commercial Speech
In 1942, the United States -Supreme Court held that the first amend-
ment's guarantee of free speech did not preclude the government from
enacting legislation which would substantially "burden or proscribe...
purely commercial advertising." 1 2 This decision established what has
been called "the commercial speech doctrine," which provided, in effect,
5 Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune, 680 F. Supp. 863, 864 (S.D. Tex. 1988). Hearn's advertisement
was first published in Soldier of Fortune in September 1984. Hearn estimated receiving ten to twenty
inquiries per day based on the advertisement and, as a result, was forced to hire a professional
answering service. He stated that about ninety percent of the calls received involved requests for
illegal acts, including activities related to illegal drugs, jail breaks, political assassinations, and illegal
arms. Hearn is serving two consecutive life sentences for the murders of Sandra Black and others.
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune,
680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (Civ. A. No. H-87-0030) (citingJohn Wayne Hearn's deposition).




10 Id. at 866.
11 Id. at 867.
12 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
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that the Constitution did not protect commercial advertising. The
Court's rationale for this conclusion is not clear from the opinion.
3
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court adhered to the doctrine for over thirty
years. 14
During that thirty year period, individual justices criticized the doc-
trine.15 However, not until 1975 did a majority of the Court clearly indi-
cate that it was beginning to question the commercial speech doctrine.1
6
Finally, in 1976, the Court abandoned the doctrine "concluding that
commercial speech, like other varieties is protected."' 7 In the cases that
followed during the next year,' 8 commercial advertising realized almost
complete first amendment protection. Since 1977, however, the Court
has eroded first amendment protection of commercial speech. 19 This
Part briefly traces the erosion by focusing on three landmark decisions
and their progeny. This erosion has reduced the constitutional protec-
tion of commercial speech to a level that is conducive to the kind of neg-
ligent advertising action seen in Eimann.2°
A. Commercial Speech Recognized as Constitutionally Protected: Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.
In the 1976 case of Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.,21 the Supreme Court faced the question
of "whether there is a first amendment exception for 'commercial
speech.' "22 The Court concluded that "speech which does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction' ... is [not] so removed from any
'exposition of ideas' ... that it lacks all [Constitutional] protection." 23 In
so concluding, the Court rejected the "commercial speech doctrine"
which had denied first amendment protection to purely commercial
speech since 1942.24
Specifically at issue in Virginia Board was the constitutionality of a
Virginia statute which prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices
13 G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 6.01 at 6-2.0 & n.2 (1973).
14 Id. at 6-2.0 n.3.
15 See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Dougas,J., concurring); Dunn &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-06 (197 1) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 393, 398,401 (1973) (Separate
dissents of Burger, CJ., Douglas, J., and Stewart, J.).
16 The Court said "[t)he fact that the particular advertisement in appellant's newspaper had
commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser's commercial interests did not negate all First Amend-
ment guarantees." Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975).
17 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
18 See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
19 See ROSDEN, § 6.01 LAW OF ADVER ISNG 6-1, 6-6.9 - 6-6.16 (1973); Lively, The Supreme Court
and Commercial Speech: New Words With an Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REv. 289 (1987); Note, Trends in
First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech, 40 VAND. L. REV. 173 (1988).
20 For a more detailed history of the first amendment protection of commercial speech, see
materials cited supra note 19.
21 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
22 L at 760-61.
23 Ia at 762 (citations omitted).
24 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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of prescription drugs.2 5 Appellees, as consumers of prescription drugs,
argued that the first amendment entitled them to "receive information
that pharmacists wish to communicate to them through advertising.
'26
Appellees claimed that because the statute banned such communication,
the statute was unconstitutional. 27 The Supreme Court agreed. 28
The Court based its holding, that advertising is entitled to first
amendment protection, on the premise that society has "a strong interest
in the free flow of commercial information."'2 9 This position marked a
clear departure from what the majority opinion called the "highly pater-
nalistic approach" 30 that the Court espoused for over three decadesA'
The cases that the Court decided in the year after Virginia Board extended
to commercial advertising its highest degree of first amendment pro-
tectionA
2
In 1978, however, the Supreme Court departed from the relatively
broad constitutional protection Virginia Board and its progeny afforded
commercial speech. In Ohlarik v. Ohio State Bar Association,33 the Court
recognized a governmental interest in regulating solicitation of a lawful
25 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 750
n.2 (citing the full text of VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.2 (a) (1974)).
26 Id. at 754.
27 Id. at 753-54.
28 Id. at 770.
29 Id. at 764. The seven member majority stated:
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that
interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate .... Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product,
for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominately free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end the free flow of commercial infor-
mation is indispensible.
Id. at 763, 765. The Court did, however, recognize that "[s]ome forms of commercial speech regula-
tion are surely permissible." Id. at 770. The Court said that these forms included regulations of
advertisements by mere time, place, and manner restrictions; regulations of advertisements that are
false and misleading; and regulations of advertisements that advocate illegal transactions. The
Court also recognized that there may be some special problems with respect to the electronic broad-
cast media and with respect to advertisements by physicians, lawyers and professionals who provide
services. But the Court specifically stated that it would not deal with these problems in this decision.
Id. at 770-73. Note that in Eimann the plaintiff was seeking damages for negligent publication and
was not seeking to regulate advertising. Therefore, none of the permissible forms of regulation
mentioned by the court may be applied to resolve the issue in Eimann.
30 Id. at 770. By "highly paternalistic approach" the Court was referring to an approach which
allows state restriction of advertising based on the state's determination that certain commercial
information is not in the best interest of the public. The Court said that neither it nor a state legisla-
ture can suppress commercial speech based on such a determination because "[i]t is precisely this
kind of choice, between suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely avail-
able, that the First Amendment makes for us." Id.
31 See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
32 See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that a state bar association's disciplinary
rule prohibiting most forms of legal advertising infringed on the appellant's first amendment rights);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that complete suppression of adver-
tisements for contraceptives is unconstitutional); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85 (1977) (holding that a township ordinance enacted to reduce the flight of white homeowners
from a racially integrated neighborhood, by prohibiting the posting of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs,
is unconstitutional).
33 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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service and upheld a state bar association's disciplinary rule restricting
lawyers' in-person solicitation of employment. By placing strong empha-
sis on the state's interest,3 4 Ohlarik set the stage for Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,35 a case in which the Supreme
Court further restricted first amendment protection of commercial
advertising.
36
B. Narrowing the Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech: Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court considered the issue of
"whether a regulation of the Public Service Commission of the State of
New York violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it com-
pletely bans promotional advertising by an electrical utility."3 7 The
Court held that a total ban violated the first amendment because it was
"more extensive than is necessary to serve the state interest."38 While
this decision was apparently a victory for free commercial speech, the five
member majority acted in a manner reminiscent of earlier paternalism by
placing strong emphasis on the state's interest in regulating the utility
company's advertisements, thereby establishing a more permissive cli-
mate for governmental restraint of commercial speech.3 9
The majority applied a four-part test in reaching its conclusion. The
Court stated:
[First], we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
first amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provi-
sion, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
[Second), we ask whether the governmental interest is substantial....
[Third], we must determine whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and [fourth] whether [the regula-
tion] is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
40
The Court found that the Commission's promotional advertising ban
failed the fourth part of the test because appellee failed to show "that a
more limited restriction on the content of promotional advertising would
not serve adequately the State's interest."
'4 '
However, several justices expressed concern over the adoption of
this test. For example, Justices Blackmun and Brennan indicated in a
concurring opinion that they believed the Court's four-part test was in-
34 Id. at 462, 468.
35 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
36 Note, Trends in First Amendment Protection of Commeraial Speech, 41 VAND. L. REV. 173, 186 (1988).
37 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. at 558.
38 Id. at 572.
39 In 1973, the Public Service Commission of New York ordered electric utility companies in the
state to stop all advertising which promoted the use of electricity. The Commission declared all
promotional advertising to be contrary to a national policy of energy conservation. The appellant,
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., challenged the order contending that it was an unconstitu-
tional restraint of commercial speech. However, the Commission's order was upheld by the New
York Court of Appeals on the ground that the governmental interest in the prohibition outweighed
the limited constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue. The United States Supreme
Court reversed. Id. at 558-59.
40 Id. at 566.
41 Id. at 570.
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consistent with the established principle "that the State 'may not [pursue
its goals] by keeping the public in ignorance.' "42 Justice Blackmun
wrote that he feared the majority's four-part test might permit a state "to
suppress information about a product in order to manipulate a private
economic decision." 43 Justice Blackmun concluded that the majority's
test "[did] not provide adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading,
noncoercive commercial speech."
'44
C. Further Narrowing of the Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech:
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico
Between 1980 and 1986 the Court inconsistently applied the Central
Hudson test.45 Then, in 1986, in its most recent major decision affecting
commercial speech,46 the Court illustrated that Justice Blackmun's fears
were justified by dropping its constitutional guard even further than in
Central Hudson. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., 47 the
Supreme Court ruled on "the facial constitutionality of a Puerto Rico
statute and regulations restricting advertising of casino gambling aimed
at the residents of Puerto Rico."'48 The Court applied the four-part
Central Hudson test and concluded that this restraint on commercial
speech was constitutional. 49  While purporting to apply the Central Hud-
son test objectively, the Supreme Court based its holding on a paternalis-
tic rationale reminiscent of the commercial speech doctrine. Despite a
decade of precedent promoting the free flow of commercial information,
the majority allowed a state legislature to suppress commercial speech
42 Id. at 576 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
43 Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
44 Id.
45 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) (the Court applied a
watered-down version of the Central Hudson test and held that the City's interest in restricting bill-
board advertising was not "manifestly unreasonable"); In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding
that restrictions on lawyer advertising were unconstitutional); Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding that a ban on unsolicited advertisements of contraceptives was unconsti-
tutional); Zauder v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (holding unconstitu-
tional a state ban on price advertising by attorneys and use of nondeceptive terminology in attorney
advertisements).
46 Posadas de P. R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 330.
49 Id. at 344. Shortly after legalizing certain forms of gambling, Puerto Rico implemented regu-
lations which prohibited gambling casinos from advertising to the public of Puerto Rico but allowed
restricted advertising outside of Puerto Rico. Pursuant to these regulations, appellant, a casino op-
erator in Puerto Rico, received several fines from the appellee, a public corporation authorized to
administer the regulations. Appellant continually protested these fines and eventually sued the ap-
pellee in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, seeking a declaratory judgment that the regulations-
both facially and as applied-unconstitutionally suppressed commercial speech. The court held that
the regulations were unconstitutional as applied to the appellant. However, the court issued a nar-
rowing construction, declaring that the regulations prohibited local advertising that encouraged resi-
dents of Puerto Rico to patronize casinos, but not local advertising directed at tourists. The court
then held that, under this construction, the regulations were facially constitutional. The Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico dismissed appellant's appeal of the lower court's decision that the regulations
were constitutionally valid, on grounds that it "d[id] not present a substantial constitutional ques-




based on the state's determination that this information was not in the
best interest of the public.50 This approach is exactly the type of pater-
nalism that the Court held unconstitutional in Virginia Board.51 In his dis-
senting opinion, Justice Brennan explained the ramifications of Posadas.
He wrote that the decision allows a state legislature to "suppress the dis-
semination of truthful information about an entirely lawful activity
merely to keep its residents ignorant ... thus dramatically shrinking the
scope of first amendment protection available to commercial speech, and
giving government officials unprecedented authority to eviscerate consti-
tutionally protected expression. ' 52 With the Posadas decision, first
amendment protection of commercial advertising has regressed to its
lowest level since the Court recognized it as constitutionally protected
expression in Virginia Board.53 As Part IV points out, one can understand
how-in an era of reduced first amendment protection-the Eimann
court could conclude that the first amendment does not preclude a negli-
gence action against a publisher for injuries alleged to be the conse-
quence of an advertisement. 54
III. Standards of Care in Advertising Cases
Due to concern that a negligence standard of liability infringes on
commercial speech interests by establishing a broad duty in publishing
advertisements, courts often restrict the scope of that duty by prescribing
a recklessness standard of care. Analysis of significant commercial adver-
tising cases reveals that courts determine whether restriction of the
publisher's duty is appropriate by applying a balancing test. Because
commercial speech still enjoys some first amendment protection,55 and
restrictions on commercial speech threaten to curtail dissemination of
noncommercial ideas as well, 56 courts should continue to employ the bal-
ance of interests approach and restrict the scope of the publisher's duty
when the free speech interests are superior. However, as Eimann indi-
cates, given the limited constitutional protection presently afforded com-
mercial speech, the free speech interests will not outweigh the plaintiff's
when the commercial speech foreseeably invites criminal conduct.57
50 The Court stated: "The [Puerto Rican] legislature could conclude, as they apparently did
here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet would
nevertheless be induced by widespread advertising to engage in such potentially harmful conduct."
lId at 344.
51 See supra note 30.
52 Posadas de P. R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U.S. at 358-59 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
53 The dissent stated: "Mhe Court totally ignores the fact that commercial speech is entitled to
substantial First Amendment protection, giving the government unprecedented authority to eviscer-
ate constitutionally protected expression." Id. at 352 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Leahy, A
Game of Chance: Commercial Speech After Posadas, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1, 1988, at 58.
54 Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune, 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
55 See supra notes 12-54 and accompanying text.
56 See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
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A. The Public Policy Standard
The balancing test in commercial speech cases involves weighing the
interests of the public policy favoring free flow of commercial informa-
tion against the interests of the injured party and public safety. 58 For
example, in a recent action in a Louisiana Federal District Court, inves-
tors sought damages from the Wall Street Journal for alleged publication of
false and misleading advertisements. 59 The plaintiffs suffered economic
losses after investing in an unsound financial institution advertised in the
newspaper. 60 In granting the publisher's motion for summary judgment,
the court stated that "[i]n weighing private and public considerations...
the public policy of not subjecting newspapers to the chilling prospect of
hordes of suits by disgruntled readers of inaccurate ads dominates." 61
When courts find that the public policy interests in the free flow of
commercial information are superior to the injured party's interests, they
generally require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had knowledge
that injury would result from the commercial speech or that he acted in
reckless disregard of the possibility. 62 The purpose of this standard is
to restrict the scope of the publisher's duty to those injured by
advertisements.
63
A clear example of the reasoning behind this standard is found in
Yuhas v. Mudge.64 In Yuhas, the plaintiffs were injured by fireworks
purchased as a result of advertisements in Popular Mechanics magazine.
The plaintiffs sought recovery from Popular Mechanics on the theory that
the magazine owed the public a duty to investigate advertised products.
58 Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 923 (E.D. La. 1987).
59 Id. at 921.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 923. See also Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 550, 409 N.Y.S.2d
473, 476 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (stating that "when faced with First Amendment arguments, the Supreme
Court employed a balancing mechanism, weighing the protections afforded by the First Amendment
against the other constitutional rights, in an effort to maximize freedom of speech and press without
detriment to other valid guarantees"); Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 290, 490
N.E.2d 898, 902 (1986) (stating that "a complaint alleging that a newspaper reader relied to his
detriment in making securities investments based on a negligent and inaccurate report ... does not
state a cause of action in tort against the newspaper's publisher for 'negligent misrepresentation.' In
such a case, the competing public policy and constitutional concerns tilt decidedly in favor of the
press when mere negligence is alleged"); Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate when plaintiff
alleged that defendant had a duty to warn of defective ideas in its book because "[t]he determination
of whether a duty should be imposed upon a defendant is based on a balancing of the societal
interest involved, the severity of the risk, the burden upon the defendant, the likelihood of occur-
rence and the relationship between the parties"); South Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen &
Hamilton, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 346, 349 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that in an action for circulation of
"false information" in a consultant's report, the balance of interests favored the plaintiff because
"[i]n balancing these interests, not all speech is to be accorded equal first amendment importance").
62 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 61, and infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
63 Pittman v. DowJones & Co., 662 F. Supp. at 922-23. The plaintiffs argued that the publisher
had a duty to investigate the accuracy of the advertisement. The court held as follows:
[T]he law is settled . . . that a duty such as that argued for here by plaintiffs may not be
imposed.... To impose the burden of investigating the accuracy of every ad would, under
ordinary circumstances, be too onerous. [Citations omitted.] In weighing private and pub-
lic considerations.., the public policy of not subjecting newspapers to the chilling prospect
of hordes of suits by disgruntled readers of inaccurate ads dominates.
Id.
64 129 N.J. Super. 207, 322 A.2d 824 (App. Div. 1974).
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In affirming summary judgment for the publisher, the court reasoned as
follows:
To impose the suggested broad legal duty upon publishers of nation-
ally circulated magazines, newspapers and other publications, would
not only be impractical and unrealistic, but would have a staggering
adverse effect on the commercial world and our economic system. For
the law to permit such exposure to those in' the publishing business
who in good faith accept paid advertisements for a myriad of products
would open the doors 'to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.'
65
While courts usually identify the free flow of commercial informa-
tion as the public interest threatened in advertising cases, 66 a California
Appellate Court in Walters v. Seventeen Magazine67 ventured beyond the
commercial information rationale and went directly to the heart of first
amendment concerns. It based its rejection of the plaintiff's negligent
advertising action on the idea that restrictions on commercial speech im-
pair the free exchange of core ideas as well.68 The court reasoned that
allowing a negligence cause of action would require a major investment
in staff resources dedicated to investigation of advertised products:
The enormous cost of such groups, along with skyrocketing insurance
rates, would deter many magazines from accepting advertising, hasten-
ing their demise from lack of revenue. Others would comply, but raise
their prices beyond the reach of the average reader. Still others would
be wiped out by tort judgments, never to revive. Soon the total
number of publications in circulation would drop dramatically. 69
New York courts are nearly unanimous in adopting the recklessness
standard in limiting the publisher's duty in commercial advertising
cases.70 In Suarez v. Underwood,71 the plaintiff sued Newsday, a daily news-
65 Id. at 825 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441,
444 (1931)). See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON ToRTs 745 (5th ed. 1984).
66 See, e.g., Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. at 922. In regard to the public policy
involved in advertising cases, the court stated:
Thus, a newspaper has no duty, whether by way of tort or contract, to investigate the accu-
racy of advertisements placed with it which are directed to the general public, unless the
newspaper undertakes to guarantee the soundness of the products advertised. [Citations
omitted.] Courts seem to be sensitive to the devastating liability notion since to ignore such
arguments could have the effect of discouraging the publication of ads dealing with valuable
public information to enable people to make informed choices. Quite simply, courts have
placed more value on the societal benefits of information availability than on the rights of
private persons who claim to have been harmed. [Citations omitted.]
Id
67 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (Ct. App. 1987).
68 Id. at 102-03. Core speech contains "'ideological expression' and is 'integrally related to the
exposition of thought.'" Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune, 680 F. Supp. 863, 865 n.2 (1988) (quoting
Virginia State Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 779 (1976)).
69 Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
70 Apparently, more actions against publishers for the results of advertisements are litigated in
New York than in any other forum because of the concentration of media organizations in that state.
Blinick v. Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 2d 254, 323 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Civ. Ct. 1971),
is the only instance in which New York courts did not apply a recklessness standard in these actions.
In that case, the plaintiff's home telephone number was mistakenly published in a "salacious" sin-
gles ad. The court found the publisher liable for the plaintiff's humiliation because it merely had to
verify the telephone number to prevent the injury. However, New York courts have not followed
this holding in other cases, apparently because they confine the holding to its factual setting.
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paper, for injuries resulting from a hair implantation advertisement. The
plaintiff argued that because the newspaper published articles concern-
ing the medical risks of hair implantation around the time it published
the advertisements, the publisher was liable for gross negligence.72 The
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, stating
that "the newspaper is only liable if it publishes a false advertisement
maliciously or with intent to harm another or acts with total reckless
abandon." 73 When courts adopt such a standard, "[t]he courts' defini-
tion of an orbit of duty based on public policy may at times result in the
exclusion of some who might otherwise have recovered for losses or inju-
ries if [a negligence standard] had been applied. ' 74 When the scope of
the publisher's duty is thus narrowed, foreseeability of the injurious con-
sequences of the advertisement "alone is not sufficient to establish
liability."
75
B. The Negligence Standard: Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune
When the publisher is held to a negligence standard, it is liable for
injury foreseeably resulting from an advertisement. Courts have been
willing to hold a publisher to such a duty in relatively few circum-
stances. 76 However, in the context of shrinking first amendment protec-
tion for commercial speech, the Eimann court predicated publisher
liability for a classified advertisement on such a standard. 77 Citing a
Posadas era decision, the Eimann court determined "there can be 'little
concern that regulation by way of a negligence cause of action will chill
• . . expression or diminish the free flow of commercial [speech].'"78
71 103 Misc. 2d 445, 426 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
72 Id. at 209.
73 Id. at 210 (quoting Goldstein v. Garlick, 65 Misc. 2d 538, 543, 318 N.Y.S.2d 370, 376 (Sup.
Ct. 1971)). Accord Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 555, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 479
(Sup. Ct 1978) (stating that "[t]he news media, for the most part, is merely the conduit for the
speech of the advertiser and, therefore, will not be held liable for the publication of advertising
which is false or misleading, unless actual malice is shown"); Pittman v. DowJones & Co., 662 F.
Supp. 92 1, 922 (E.D. La. 1987) (stating that "publication of a false advertisement is actionable only if
the ad was published maliciously, with intent to harm, or in reckless disregard of the consequences
of the ad").
74 Vaill v. Oneida Dispatch Corp., 129 Misc. 2d 477,480,493 N.Y.S.2d 414,416 (Sup. Ct. 1985)
(quoting Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 402-03, 482 N.E.2d 34, 36, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555,
557 (1985)).
75 493 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (quoting Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical Center Hosp., 54 N.Y.2d 277,
280, 429 N.E.2d 789, 791, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111, 113 (1981)).
76 See also Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40-42, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472-74 (1975)
(holding that a radio station was liable for wrongful death of a motorist killed when a contestant in
defendant's radio contest forced decedent's car off the road); Blinick v. Long Island Daily Press
Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 2d 254, 255-56, 323 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854-55 (Civ. Ct. 1971), discussed supra
note 70; South Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 346, 351
(D.D.C. 1987), discussed supra note 61; Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc., v. Mark-Fi Records,
Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 401-03, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding that music publisher had a cause of
action against the defendant broadcasting company as a contributory infringer for negligently
broadcasting advertisements by an illicit manufacturer of record albums).
77 See supra notes 5-I1 and accompanying text.
78 Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune, 680 F. Supp. 863, 866 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (citing South Carolina
State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 346, 350 (D.D.C. 1987)).
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The Eimann court, unpersuaded by the publisher's free speech objection,
ruled that the plaintiff could proceed.
79
After Posadas, the Eimann court's conclusion is certainly not unrea-
sonable. The court's ruling seems especially justifiable considering that
Posadas upheld a prior restraint on the commercial advertising of a lawful
activity.8 0 As the Eimann court noted, "[i]n the instant case, Plaintiffs do
not seek to regulate commercial speech [as in Posadas] but only to re-
cover damages for negligent publication."
8 1
Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune, 2 a case cited by the Eimann court in
support of its holding, is essentially identical to Eimann in its pertinent
facts and result.8 3 The Norwood court emphasized that commercial
speech is not protected to the same extent as core speech.8 4 It recog-
nized that an advertisement in the nature of a "gun for hire" was differ-
ent from the kind of speech contemplated by the first amendment, and
that the case should therefore go forward so ajury could determine if the
plaintiff's injuries should have been foreseen by the publisher.8 5 Thus,
upon balancing the interests involved, the Norwood court did not find a
recklessness standard of care justified when, in an era of reduced com-
mercial speech protection, the subject of the advertisement is a "gun for
hire."
IV. The Impact of Eimann: A Proposed Standard of Care for Future
"Negligent Advertising" Actions
Considering the thin veil of constitutional protection presently af-
forded commercial speech,8 6 the news media and other publishers which
rely on advertising as a primary revenue source understandably express
concern about what the Eimann decision portends.8 7 Imposing such an
onerous duty on publishers with respect to all advertisements would
likely chill commercial expression through either the extensive costs of
investigation or the threat of extensive litigation.88 However, the deci-
sion does not necessarily represent a broad movement toward adoption
of the foreseeability standard. Narrowly read, it merely represents a de-
termination that when the commercial speech foreseeably invites crimi-
nal conduct, the interests of the plaintiff and society in protection from
consequential injury outweighs the publisher's interest in free speech. In
other words, the balancing of the parties' interests in Eimann favors the
plaintiff. It is the foreseeable invitation to criminal activity, and the cor-
responding risk to public safety, that justified the Eimann court's decision
to permit an action against an advertisement publisher based on negli-
gence rather than malicious intent or recklessness.
79 Id at 865.
80 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
81 Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune, 680 F. Supp. at 865.
82 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
83 Id. at 1397-98, 1401-02.
84 Id. at 1399-1401.
85 Id. at 1401-02.
86 See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
87 Kent, Magazine Liable for Ad Negligence, 199 N.Y.LJ., Mar. 25, 1988, at 2, col. 1.
88 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
19891
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The court apparently recognized that its decision might cause con-
cern among publishers. In attempting to allay these fears, the court qual-
ified its holding by stating that the holding did not apply to core speech,
and argued that a negligence standard would not result in liability if the
failure to investigate the nature of the advertisement was reasonable. 89
Unfortunately, the general standard of "reasonable care" 90 espoused by
the court is not specific enough to delineate the limited impact that
Eimann should have on the scope of an advertisement publisher's tort
liability. The court should have limited its holding in favor of negligent
advertising actions to cases where the advertisement foreseeably invited
criminal conduct. Instead, it supported its holding by noting that a negli-
gent defamation action by a private person is not precluded by the first
amendment, and cited supporting holdings in three earlier negligent
commercial speech cases. 91
Thus, in an effort to avoid unwarranted expansion of publisher lia-
bility based on Eimann, this Part proposes a standard for courts to apply
in future "negligent advertising" actions. The proposed standard is
designed to provide a civil remedy that reasonably balances a publisher's
interest in free speech with society's interest in protection from injuries
which are the result of advertisements foreseeably inviting criminal
activity.
The proposed standard has five elements: (1) the plaintiff's injuries
must be a foreseeable consequence of an advertisement, (2) which, at the
time of publication, (3) the publisher knew or should have known,
through the exercise of reasonable care, (4) foreseeably invited criminal
activity, (5) which caused the plaintiff's injury. With respect to the third
element, factors to consider in determining whether the publisher
"should have known" include the content of the advertisement, the na-
ture of the publication, and the nature of the publication's readership.92
If the trier of fact determines, in light of these factors and by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that through the exercise of reasonable care, the
publisher should have known the advertisement foreseeably invited crim-
inal activity, then the publisher should be liable for the foreseeable con-
sequences of the advertisement. The third element imposes a duty on
the publisher to exercise reasonable care to investigate the nature of the
advertisement. Finally, in regard to the fourth and fifth elements, if the
injuries are the consequence of something other than criminal activity,
then the malicious intent or recklessness standard should apply, unless
the governing law provides otherwise. 93
89 Eimann, 680 F. Supp. 866.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 865. For further explanation of the three cases, see supra notes 82-85 and accompanying
text on Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune, 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987); supra note 76 on
Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975); and supra note 61 on South
Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C 1987).
92 These factors were addressed in the Eimann ruling. See Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune, 680 F.
Supp. at 866.
93 For example, in a case involving defamation of a private person (as opposed to defamation of
a public figure or a public official) a publisher may be held to a negligence standard. See Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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These elements take into account Eimann's unstated rationale. The
significant interest in protecting the public from injury occasioned by an
advertisement which the publisher knew or should have known invited
criminal activity outweighs the publisher's free speech interest in pub-
lishing such an advertisement. Thus, requiring the publisher to use ordi-
nary care to investigate advertisements of this nature is reasonable.94 By
including the criminal activity element, the proposed standard limits ap-
plication of a negligence standard to a narrow class of cases in which the
competing public interest clearly outweighs the publisher's free speech
interest. 95
IV. Conclusion
Until the Supreme Court reduced the first amendment protection
available to publishers of commercial speech, lower courts generally re-
quired proof of recklessness in actions against publishers for the injuri-
ous results of advertisements. 96 However, by its willingness to employ a
negligence standard, or duty of ordinary care, the Eimann court signalled
a potential for expanded publisher liability. Courts hearing such cases
94 The duty that the proposed standard imposes on an advertisement publisher is somewhat
analogus to the duty that tort law imposes on an employer with respect to hiring and retention of an
employee. That is, where there is foreseeable risk of harm to others the employer has a duty to
select competent, experienced and careful employees. If the employer breaches that duty, he may be
personally liable to a third person for his negligence in hiring or retaining an employee who is
incompetent or unfit. "Such negligence usually consists of hiring or retaining the employee with
knowledge of his unfitness, or failing to use reasonable care to discover it before hiring or retaining
him. The theory is that such negligence on the part of the employer is a wrong to such a third
person, entirely independent of the liability of the employer under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior." 53 AM. JUR. 2d Master and Servant § 422 (1970).
95 Some brief examples may demonstrate how the proposed standard limits Eimann's impact:
1. Assume Popular Mechanics magazine publishes an advertisement for a completely lawful
product, a new lawn mower, which has been safety tested and approved. Plaintiff sees the ad and
purchases the lawn mower which malfunctions and injures Plaintiff. Plaintiff sues Popular Mechanics
for negligent publication of the advertisement. The proposed standard would not apply because
Plaintiff's injuries were not the result of criminal activity.
2. A local newspaper publishes Ms. X's advertisement in the newspaper's "Personals" column.
The advertisement says that X is looking for a new roommate, would like to interview interested,
female, college sophomores at X's apartment at 123 Main St. afternoons between three and four
o'clock. Ms. Q reads the ad and goes to visit X. Q is met by Mr. Y, who in fact submitted the ad
using Ms. X's name. Y is a twice-convicted rapist recently released from State Prison. Y sexually
assaults Q who subsequently sues the newspaper for negligent publication of the advertisement.
The proposed standard would apply. However, the newspaper would probably not be found liable
because considering the content of the ad, the nature of the publication, and the nature of the publi-
cation's readership, Q will probably be unable to establish that the newspaper should have known
the advertisement invited criminal activity.
3. Soldier of Fortune magazine publishes an advertisement entitled "How to Disappear." The
advertisement describes a method of taking on a new identity, leaving your past behind you, and
beginning a new life. After reading the ad, Reverend Z embezzles $50,000.00 in church funds and
kills the church handyman, who bears a close physical resemblance to Z. Z mutilates the body in an
attempt to remove identifying features. He then clads the body in Z's clothes, places the body in the
church office, sets fire to the church, and flees with the money and a fraudulently obtained driver's
license bearing his picture and a new name. The body is later identified, Z is arrested, and Z con-
fesses that he got the idea for the bizarre scheme from the ad in Soldier of Fortune. (The facts in this
example are taken from a recent criminal jury trial. See Humphrey, In a Tennessee Church, Death of a
Handyman, 11 N.LJ., Oct. 3, 1988, at 8.) Relatives of the murdered handyman sue Soldier of Fortune
for negligent publication of the advertisement. The proposed standard would apply, and it is likely
that the plantiffs may be able to prove each of the elements by a preponderance of the evidence.
96 See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
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now confront a crossroads in advertising law. Courts can use the result
in Eimann as precedent for broadened publisher liability. Alternatively,
they can restrict the holding to its factual context, specifically to cases
where the advertisement invited criminal conduct. This Comment ar-
gues that the better result is to read Eimann narrowly. If courts continue
to use a balancing test in these cases, they should similarly conclude that
allowing negligent advertising actions absent the element of foreseeable
criminal conduct unduly burdens the commercial interests of the
publisher.
More significant than the commercial impact, however, is the possi-
bility that publisher liability based on a negligence standard could ulti-
mately restrict the dissemination of core ideas as well as commercial
speech. Because the negligence standard broadens the duty to investi-
gate advertisements, it requires that publishers divert staff resources and
choose between forgoing revenues and defending civil actions. Conse-
quently, survival of the publishing institutions which serve as primary ve-
hicles of free speech in our society is made more uncertain. Conversely,
when an advertisement seemingly invites criminal activity, it is reason-
able to expect publishers to exercise ordinary care in investigating the
nature of the ad. Courts should reconcile these concerns by restricting
negligent advertising actions to cases where the publisher should have
known that the advertisement would promote criminal activity.
Donald B. Allegro
John D. LaDue
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